The design of government portfolios, i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders, constitutes a largely ignored aspect of executive and coalition politics. In this article, we argue that portfolio design is a substantively and theoretically relevant phenomenon with major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics. Based on comparative data on portfolio design reforms in nine Western European countries since the 1970s, we show how the design of government portfolios changes over time. Specifically, we show that portfolio design is changed frequently (on average about once a year) and that these reforms are more likely after changes in the prime ministership and the party composition of the government. Our findings suggest a political logic behind these reforms based on the preferences and power of political parties and politicians. They have major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics. Döring H and Manow P (2018). Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov):
Introduction
The formation of a new cabinet involves many decisions: Which parties form the cabinet? Which parties and individuals get to control which ministry? And what policy program does the cabinet agree upon? While these questions have been at the centre of scholarly attention for decades (for reviews see e.g. Laver 1998; Laver and Schofield 1990; Müller 2009), another crucial decision has been largely overlooked by political science research: How are government ministries designed, i.e. which ministries and office holders are in charge of what policy areas? While coalitio n researchers usually treat ministries as exogenous payoffs to be distributed, this article casts serious doubt on this assumption by showing that the makeup of ministries is often reformed in the context of coalition formation.
A few examples illustrate that the design of government portfolios is sometimes changed drastically. In 2016, the incoming British Prime Minister Theresa May created a new Department for Exiting the European Union charged with managing the Brexit process. In 2010, the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán reduced the number of ministries from fourteen to eight creating some ministries with extensive jurisdictions, e.g. a Department of Finance and Economics. Below the level of such comprehensive reforms involving the creation and termination of entire ministr ies, individual competencies are frequently shifted between existing ministries. For example, the jurisdictions for energy, consumer protection, urban development, and digital infrastructure were reassigned to new ministries at the beginning of the third German cabinet headed by Angela Merkel in 2013.
This manuscript introduces a comparative research project that systematically studies such reforms of portfolio design across nine Western European democracies. We define portfolio design as the distribution of competencies among governme nt ministries and office holders (i.e. ministers and junior ministers). The manuscr ipt argues that such reforms are substantively relevant phenomena that should affect policy-making and policy outputs and are theoretically important for various strands of political science research, most importantly the literatures on deliberate institutio na l design and coalition research. We discuss the scarce existing literature and argue that a systematic study of portfolio design should take a comparative approach without neglecting in-depth expertise of individual countries.
Towards this end, we introduce a new comparative dataset covering portfolio design changes in nine Western European democracies since 1970. Based on these data, the article investigates two fundamental research questions: first, how frequent are changes in portfolio design and thus how realistic is the assumption of ministries as exogenous payoffs that is central for the literature on portfolio allocation (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011; Laver and Shepsle 1996, 49) ? Second, can political events related to changes in the government explain the timing of portfolio design reforms, which would suggest that such reforms are an integral part of the government formation process? Our empirical analysis first demonstrates that reforms occur frequently, on average roughly once a year. Furthermore, changes in portfolio design are much more likely after changes in the party composition of the cabinet and the person of the prime minis ter, whereas changes in the cabinet' ideological position and in the relative size of cabinet parties yield only weak additional effects. These findings suggest that portfolio design is indeed driven by a political logic and can be considered a distinct strategy that government parties employ to adapt the distribution of competencies to their advantage. We point to several implications of these findings for the general literat ure on institutional design and for coalition research in the concluding section.
Why study portfolio design?
Thus far, the design of cabinet portfolios has received little scholarly attention. This omission is surprising given the central role that ministries play in modern democracies. In this section, we outline three reasons for studying the politics of portfolio design: (1) the substantive importance of ministries in policy-making, (2) the theoretical relevance of deliberate institutional reform as a strategy of political actors, and (3) the theoretical and methodological relevance of the changes in portfolio design for the study of coalition politics.
First, portfolio design should affect government policy because ministries play a dominant role in the policy-making process. Ministries enjoy ample leeway in the drafting stage of new legislation and its subsequent implementation (e.g. Andeweg
2000
; Huber and Shipan 2002; Knill and Tosun 2012; Laver and Shepsle 1994; Peters 2010; Schnapp 2004) . Even though individual ministries are constrained (to varying degrees) by collective decision-making in the cabinet and central coordination by the prime minister (Dahlström et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2000; Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995) , there is little doubt that ministries are crucial for everyday decisions and also enjoy disproportionate influence on major policy decisions within their jurisdiction (Laver and Shepsle 1994; Müller 1994) . Accordingly, changes in the design of portfolios, especially the reallocation of jurisdictions from one ministry to another, should affect policy-making.
This effect is independent of what position one takes on the much-disputed question of how strong the political leadership, i.e. the minister, is able to steer policy within her department. If minsters are strong, they can put their own stamp on policy decisions so that changes in portfolio design should affect policymaking due to the impact of individual ministers, especially if jurisdictions are shifted between ministr ies controlled by different parties. If, on the other hand, policymaking is dominated by the ministerial bureaucracy, differences in the preferences of bureaucrats, established links to policy networks and interest groups, as well as ministry-specific ways of framing problems and possible solutions should lead bureaucrats in different ministries to perceive and address policy problems differently (e.g. Sabatier and Weible 2007; Scharpf 1997, 39-40; Smeddinck and Tils 2002, 262-66) . This effect should be particularly visible if policy decisions have to balance conflicting goals. For example, energy policy involves a fundamental trade-off between economic prerogatives and environmental concerns. It is plausible to expect that this trade-off will be addressed differently depending on whether energy policy is drafted in a ministry of economics or a ministry of the environment.
Beyond the expected policy impact, changes in portfolio design are often symbolic political events that are used to signal specific issue emphasis of the governme nt (Derlien 1996; Mortensen and Green-Pedersen 2015) . Examples include the creation of super-ministries such as the Ministry for Economics and Labour in Germany in 2002, the creation of the Department for Exiting the European Union ('Ministry for Brexit') in Britain in 2016, and the establishment of environmental ministries in many countries in the 1980s. Both the influence of ministries on policymaking and the political signalling effect make reforms of portfolio design substantively relevant phenomena.
Second, reforms of portfolio design constitute a distinct, but thus far largely ignored strategy that political actors can use in pursuit of their substantive interests. Rational choice institutionalist research, in particular, claims that actors reform institutio na l rules if they expect a different institutional setup to be more suitable for reaching their substantive goals (e.g. Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003; Ostrom 2005; Tsebelis 1990, Ch. 4 ). Empirical research found support for this claim in the design of electoral system (e.g. Benoit 2004 Benoit , 2007 Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Renwick 2011; Vowles 1995) , parliamentary organization (e.g. André et al. 2016; Binder 1996; Dion 1997; Schickler 2000; Sieberer and Müller 2015; Zubek 2015) , and political regime types (Cheibub 2007; Przeworski 1992) . Surprisingly, however, there is very little empirical research on the internal organization of the executive branch that tests whether these theoretical arguments are also valid for the distribution of competencies between ministr ies.
Given the substantive importance of ministries, this question is essential for a general understanding of institutional reform as a deliberate strategy of political actors in parliamentary democracies.
Third, portfolio design is directly relevant for the study of coalition politics because it challenges the standard assumption that ministries are exogenous payoffs to be distributed in coalition formation and because it points to an additional mechanism for mutual control within the cabinet. Coalition research treats ministerial positions as key payoffs in the coalition formation game, either for the office benefits they entail or for the influence they provide on policy (Druckman and Warwick 2005; Laver and Schofield 1990; Raabe and Linhart 2014) . Thus, an established strand of research analyses the allocation of ministries between coalition partners, both with regard to the quantitative allocation and to the question of which specific ministries are assigned to which party (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011; Carroll and Cox 2007; Ecker et al. 2015; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013; Laver 1998; Laver and Schofield 1990; Raabe and Linhart 2015; Verzichelli 2008; Warwick and Druckman 2006) . This research usually assumes (often implicitly) that portfolios are fixed and that their design is exogenous to the allocation process. One justification for this assumption is the need to hold some aspects constant in order to increase the traceability of the assignment process, especially for modelling purposes (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 49-50) . While this argument is methodologically valid, it can be problematic if politica l actors frequently and deliberately alter the makeup of ministries in the allocatio n process. This would suggest that the design of government portfolios is an essential element of the government formation process that deserves explanation. Previously available data and the new empirical evidence we present below indicate that this may well be the case.
Moving beyond the allocation process, the design of cabinet portfolios can also contribute to the literature on coalition governance (e.g. Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Strøm et al. 2008; Thies 2001) . For one, the allocation of related jurisdictions to different ministries controlled by different parties can be conceptualized as an additional mechanism by which coalition partners control each other and reign in ministers from other parties (Saalfeld and Schamburek 2014) .
Furthermore, portfolio design can be used to strengthen the position of the prime minister by creating parallel structures in the prime minister's office to oversee policymaking within ministries (Fleischer 2011) or by allocating jurisdictions to specific ministers in order to reduce preference heterogeneity and thus the danger of agency loss (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). Third, portfolio design also matters for the analysis of individual ministerial careers because removing or granting competencies can be a mechanism for prime ministers and other government leaders (e.g. leaders of smaller coalition partners) to punish or reward individual minis ters (Indridason and Kam 2008).
Conceptualizing and measuring portfolio design
Despite its substantive and theoretical importance, the politics of portfolio design is largely uncharted territory. Existing research mainly focused on the number of ministries as a rough indicator of portfolio design, both in comparative analyses (Davis et al. 1999; Indridason and Bowler 2014; Verzichelli 2008) These studies show that cabinet size varies massively both between countries and over time. A brief look at a sample of 29 European democracies since 1945 (or the date of democratization) shows that in an average country, the number of ministers in the largest cabinet was almost 80 percent higher than in the smallest one. In 19 of 29 countries, the difference was at least 50 percent, in seven even 100 percent or more.
These differences stem from frequent changes in cabinet size: Only 37 percent of all cabinets in this sample contain the same number of ministers as the previous one whereas 28 (34) percent witness a decrease (increase) in cabinet size. 1 However, changes in cabinet size are only the tip of the iceberg and mask frequent shifts in jurisdictions between established ministries. Such changes have so far only been documented in a limited number of single-country studies. A study of Britain states that 125 government departments were involved in reconfigurations from 1950 to 2009, while the net change in the number of ministries was much smaller (White and Dunleavy 2010, Figure 6 ). In Germany, 38 reforms of portfolio design between 1957 and 2015 affected 147 ministries. Of those changes, only a small minor ity involved the creation (6) or termination (13) of a ministry whereas 128 were jurisdictional shifts between established ministries (Sieberer 2015) .
Such single-country studies have obvious merits for understanding the country analysed and can dig much deeper with regard to data collection and context specific 1 Own calculations based on data from the European Representative Democracy Data Archive (Andersson et al. 2014 ).
explanations. However, they are inherently limited with regard to generalizability and compatibility with existing comparative work (especially in the area of coalitio n research). Furthermore, single country studies cannot assess the impact of institutio na l factors that are stable within countries such as second-order rules on how portfolio design can be reformed, the prevailing cabinet format, or the power of prime minis ters and heads of state in the government formation (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Strøm et al. 2003) . To alleviate these problems, we outline a cross-national design below that allows us to go beyond single countries while remaining attentive to crucial country-specific peculiarities with regard to data collection. Before, the next section develops theoretical expectations on the conditions under which reforms of portfolio design should occur.
Explaining changes in portfolio design
The core theoretical claim of this article holds that portfolio design reforms are driven by a 'political logic', i.e. parties and politicians change the design of governme nt portfolios according to their political preferences. 2 One way to test this core expectation is studying the timing of reforms. 3 If portfolio design is changed for political reasons, reforms should cluster temporally after events that change the preference constellation among the relevant political actors. Changes in the cabinet are 2 Public administration research attributes changes in portfolio design to the workability of the 'machinery of government'. While empirical research on individ ua l reforms finds examples where these concerns play a role (Busse 2006; Davis et al. 1999; Derlien 1996; Heppell 2011; Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Pollitt 1984; White and Dunleavy 2010) , even proponents concede that efficiency concerns are only one of many reasons for reallocating jurisdictions (Davis et al. 1999; Derlien 1996; Pollitt 1984) . 3 Timing is certainly not the only way to identify a political logic in portfolio design reforms. More targeted analyses analyze the content and beneficiaries of reforms based on specific assumptions about the goals of political actors such as increasing their expected office and policy payoffs or controlling coalition partners by creating overlapping jurisdictions between ministries. We discuss these perspectives for future research in more detail in the concluding section.
the most important events in this respect. However, cabinets can change in various ways. Distinguishing between different types of changes, we can go beyond the simple expectation that the preference constellation in the cabinet matters for portfolio design reforms and identify which changes are decisive. This argument is particularly strong in countries like Germany, where portfolio design is the prerogative of the head of government. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Changes in portfolio design become more likely when the Prime minister changes.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on changes in the cabinet's composition. In the following, we analyse two factors that go beyond binary reform measures and capture the magnitude of change that takes place. For one, changes in portfolio design could depend on the ideological differences between the current cabinet and its predecessor (Dahlström and Holmgren 2017) . Ideological shifts between cabinets are often associated with changes in issue positions and priorities of the cabinet parties. Parties might thus feel the need to change the design of government portfolios in ways that reflect these new priorities. For example, the new Danish centre-right coalitio n government in 2001 established an independent ministry for 'refugees, immigrants and integration' and stripped down the competencies of the 'environment and energy' department (e.g. moving 'energy' to the economics department). Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: Changes in portfolio design become more likely when the ideological position of the cabinet changes.
Moreover, changes in the relative size of parties within the cabinet could have an additional effect on portfolio design. Ample research shows that party size is a crucial predictor of the distribution of office and policy payoffs within coalitions (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011; Warwick and Druckman 2006) . Beyond a strong orientation towards proportionality, several studies show that small parties are slightly overpaid with regard to the number of portfolios (Browne and Franklin 1973; Warwick and Druckman 2006) . One way to allocate more office to small parties is to adapt portfolio design, e.g. by splitting ministries or moving policy jurisdictions to ministr ies controlled by small parties (Sieberer 2015) . Changes in the relative sizes of cabinet parties can be measured via the partisan fragmentation within the cabinet leading to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Changes in portfolio design become more likely when the fragmentation in the cabinet changes.
Studying portfolio design comparatively
In this section, we outline our approach to studying portfolio design comparative ly across nine Western European democracies. While our conceptual definition of portfolio design and its reform is quite straightforward, measuring it empirically is a rather complex task that requires in-depth field knowledge to gather and correctly code the relevant information. For one, the power to determine portfolio design is granted to different actors, i.e. the head of state in some countries, the head of government in others, and the legislature via law-making in yet others. Second, in many instances the documents outlining portfolio design are not readily available but have to be identified via archival work, especially for earlier periods. Third, reforms include both substantive changes and minuscule administrative or purely technical changes (such as correcting typos) that are not always easy to distinguish. Finally, some minister ia l jurisdictions are country-specific and their relevance is hard to judge without in-depth knowledge of the respective political system.
To deal with these challenges, we collected data in a decentralized way as a team of country experts based on joint coding instructions. This strategy achieves an optimal balance between country-specific expertise and conceptual coherence. We analyse portfolio design reforms in nine West European countries over up to 45 years (from 1 January 1970 to 31 December 2015): Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden (see Table 1 ). This set of countries provides substantial variation in institutional setup and party system characteristics, e.g.
regarding the power and role of prime ministers (Strøm et al. 2003) , formal powers of heads of state (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006) , the government formation process (Laver and Schofield 1990, 210) , the types of governments that are formed (Müller and Strøm 2000) , and the format of the party system (Mair 2002) .
Based on our definition of portfolio design, we code changes in portfolio design as instances in which the distribution of competencies among departments (ministr ies) changes or the distribution of competencies among office holders (ministers and junior ministers) is modified. Thus, mere cabinet reshuffles without an alternation in policy responsibilities are not analysed. By contrast, changes in the number of departments and/or office holders do constitute a change in portfolio design because new or discarded offices and/or office holders gain or lose competencies, respectively. In addition, moving officeholders (most notably junior ministers) with fixed competencies between departments also counts as a change in portfolio design. As Table 1 indicates, the formal rules in which portfolio design is codified, and thus the data sources for our coding, vary across countries. The empirical analysis below controls for these differences. Based on these data sources, the country experts identified all changes in portfolio design during the period of investigation and provided a short description of the reform (Which departments were involved? Which competencies were affected?). In a second step, we excluded purely technical reforms and instances with no (or very minor) changes in policy jurisdictions. Moreover, consecutive changes within a few days that were clearly part of a single process are treated as one reform and dated with the earliest available date to capture the starting point of the reform process. 6 In total, we identified 339 changes in portfolio design in our sample. 7 In the supplemental materia l (Appendix A), we describe three randomly selected reforms from our dataset in greater detail showing that these changes were substantial and had the potential to affect policy processes and outcomes.
Empirical results
This section presents empirical results on the frequency and timing of portfolio design reforms. It shows that the 'fixed structure' assumption of an exogenously given design of ministerial portfolios is often violated. 8 Furthermore, the timing of reforms suggests that political motives play a major role. More specifically, we find that changes in portfolio design are much more likely after changes in the party composition of the cabinet (H1) and the identity of the prime minister (H2), whereas changes in the cabinet's ideological position (H3) and its fragmentation (H4) have only weak additional effects. This cross-country variation does not seem to be linked to the second-order rules of how portfolio design is changed. In Austria and Italy, changes in the competencies between different departments are regulated by law, which requires approval by a parliamentary majority and thus arguably involves more veto players than in countries where reforms are possible via decrees. 9 However, the two countries differ markedly with regard to reform frequency. While portfolio design is in fact rather stable in Austria, it changes frequently in Italy. Moreover, there is substantial variation across countries that use some sort of decree to change the competencies between differe nt departments and office holders.
The frequency of changes in portfolio design
There is also no clear time trend in our data beyond some country-specific patterns.
Changes in portfolio design become more likely over time in Austria and, to a lesser extent, in Norway whereas reforms in Denmark were more frequent in the 1970s than today. Yet, by and large we see no clear temporal trends that are worth noting.
Explaining the timing of changes in portfolio design
This section employs event history analysis to test our hypotheses on the timing of reforms. We use Cox proportional hazards models to estimates the 'hazard rate', i.e.
'the instantaneous probability that an event occurs given that the event has not yet occurred' (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1427) . In our context, the hazard rate describes the probability that the portfolio design currently in place is reformed at a specific point in time depending on various covariates, most notably the occurrence of the four events identified above. As these events can occur at different times during a and then use the absolute difference between the positions of the current cabinet and its predecessor. For measuring the change in fragmentation within the cabinet (H4), we use the absolute difference in the effective number of cabinet parties from the previous to the current cabinet (Laakso and Taagepera 1979 in its fragmentation (H4). Against our hypotheses, the coefficients of both variables are negative and statistically significant albeit, as we show below, substantively weak.
To interpret these effects in a more meaningful way, we simulate and plot surviva l functions based on results of the full model for different analytically meaningful scenarios (Ruhe 2016) . 12 Putting the remaining covariates at their means (continuo us variables) and mode (categorical variables) 13 , the graphs in Figure 1 show the probability that a given portfolio design remains in place ('survives') over time depending on the values of our key covariates. The dashed lines indicate the probability of portfolio design stability in the aftermath of the four simulated events.
The solid lines indicate survival functions if the respective event had not occurred. 14 12 The plots of the effects based on Models 1 to 4 are shown in the supplementary material (Appendix C). 13 Specifically, we model effects for a non-caretaker coalition government in the 2000s in a country where portfolio design is changed by decrees (rather than laws), with a slight increase in unemployment (+0.06 percentage points), and where no other events have taken place. Changes in the cabinet's policy position and fragmentation, however, are contingent on changes in the cabinet's party composition. For these covariates, we assume that the party composition of the cabinet has changed. 14 For changes in continuous variables, we plot survival functions for a simulated change in the respective variable for 'no change' (zero; roughly the mean) and an increase by one standard deviation.
Figure 1: Predicted stability of portfolio designs
Note: All estimates are based on the Model 5 in Table 3 , while the remaining covariates are held constant at their mean or mode, respectively. For the (changes in) continuous variables, curves show the stability for "no change" (zero; roughly the mean) and an increase by one standard deviation. Plots based on the scurve_tvc command by Ruhe (2016) . Figure 1 shows that a reform of portfolio design is much more likely after the party composition of the government has changed (H1; upper left panel in Figure 1 ). According to the model, both variables have very strong effects -it is almost certain that the portfolio deign is reformed within one year after changes in the cabinet's party composition or the prime ministership. However, this result is not all that surprising in light of previous research. Verzichelli (2008) finds that only about one third of all cabinets have the same number of ministers as their predecessors. This measure underestimates changes in policy responsibilities because it only captures net changes (e.g. ignores reforms that create and abolish the same number of ministries) and neglects the transfer of policy jurisdictions between ministries. It is therefore not too surprising to find even more frequent changes using our more fine-grained data. Turning to the control variables, the probability of portfolio design reforms is substantially higher after general elections and for coalition governments. Both findings are consistent with a political logic in which elections are decisive events and the distribution of benefits among multiple cabinet parties is a major driver of reforms.
According
The formal rules to change portfolio design (decrees vs. laws) also affect reform frequency: portfolio designs that can only be changed by laws are somewhat more stable than those that can be altered by decrees. The control variable on caretaker status and the decade dummies do not have statistically significant effects. Finally, there is evidence that economic performance affects portfolio design change: the probability of reform increases with increases in the unemployment rate, which can be interpreted as an institutional reaction to performance deficits.
Conclusion
As the first systematic comparative study of changes in the design of governme nt portfolios in Western European democracies, this article provides two core insights.
First, reforms of portfolio design are frequent (339 cases in nine countries over a period of 45 years). This finding casts serious doubt on the standard assumption of coalitio n researchers that 'the administrative structure of the state changes only very occasionally in the real world' (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 271) . Second, these reforms occur after political events, most notably changes in the government's composition in terms of parties and the identity of the prime minister. These findings suggest that changes in portfolio design follow a political logic that is driven by preference alterations among the relevant political actors.
Our findings have important implications for the general literature on institutio na l design and for coalition research. For one, the patterns of change are consistent with previous research on purposive institutional design showing that reforms of electoral systems, parliamentary organization, and political regime types can be explained with reference to goals and strategies of political actors. While the timing of reforms suggests a political logic for portfolio design as well, timing data cannot provide direct evidence for this argument because it does not capture which actors benefit from these reforms.
In future work we seek to explore this question in greater detail. For example, do parties use changes in portfolio design to increase their payoffs in the portfolio allocation process, either in quantitative terms (e.g. Sieberer 2015; Warwick and Druckman 2006) Second, the frequency of reforms cast serious doubt on the validity of assuming that government portfolios are exogenous to the government formation process as the vast majority of studies on the allocation of government portfolios does (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011; Carroll and Cox 2007; Ecker et al. 2015; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013; Laver 1998; Laver and Schofield 1990; Verzichelli 2008; Warwick and Druckman 2006) . Our findings suggest that the design of portfolios is not exogenous but should be conceptualized as an important outcome of the government formation process. Thus, they highlight the need for an integrative analysis of different decisions taken during coalition formation. These decisions include the partisan composition of the cabinet, its policy program, portfolio allocation, and also portfolio design. Recent work has begun to endogenize some aspects such as the choice of formateur that have previously been taken as exogenous when explaining portfolio allocation (Bassi 2013; Cutler et al. 2016) . The findings in this article suggest that the design of cabinet portfolios constitutes another dimension we need to consider in moving towards an integrative analysis of government formation as a multidimensional bargain (Dewan 17 The changes affected the jurisdictions of several ministers. A minister for 'refugees, immigrants and integration' took over competencies from the ministers of the interior (e.g. residence permits), justice (e.g. citizenship), education (e.g. language teaching), finance, cities and housing, and social affairs. The department for 'IT and research' was recast into 'science, technology and development' gaining responsibilities from the department of education (esp. higher education) and business affairs. Two former independent departments (economy and business affairs) were merged and jurisdictions over interior and health were fused in a 'ministry of the interior and health'. The ministry of 'labour' changed its name to 'employment' and gained competencies from the department of social affairs (e.g. active employme nt policy). The former department for 'Cities and Housing' was abolished and most of its jurisdictions were moved to the department of 'economic and business affairs'. The former ministry for 'environment and energy' lost many of its key jurisdiction which were transferred to the departments of 'economy & business affairs' (esp. energy), culture (e.g. monument preservation), education (forestry colleges), and foreign affairs (e.g. development aid with relation to the environment). In sum, these changes indicate a shift in the issue agenda of the newly installed centre-right government.
The French reform in May 1974 followed the presidential election in that year that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing won in a close race against François Mitterrand. In an attempt to moderate tensions in the Gaullist camp, he nominated Jacques Chirac as prime minister on 27 May. The day after, the 'decret du 28 mai 1974 portant nomination des membres du government' was published. 18 The reform contained in 17 https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=20966 18 http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/all/ve/pdf/jo_giscard_gvt_chirac_29mai74_9juin7 4.pdf Table B .1, while the remaining covariates are held constant at their mean or mode, respectively. For the (changes in) continuous variables, curves show the stability for "no change" (zero; roughly the mean) and an increase by one standard deviation. Plots based on the scurve_tvc command by Ruhe (2016) .
